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truck from Chicago to Canton. In Chicago, the driver falsely represented
the truck as his own and picked up a load for delivery east of Canton.
The accident happened on the direct route, so the driver was within the
authorized limits of space and tune, and ostensibly doing what he was
supposed to do, i.e., deliver a truck to Canton. However, the Supreme Court
held that the intent to go beyond Canton, coupled with the unauthorized
load consigned to a point beyond Canton, took the driver out of the
course of his employment as a matter of law.
HUGH ALAN Ross

ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Representation of Both Sides in a Case Without Disclosure
To the Court - Contempt of Court
A court of appeals decision which was discussed in the Survey of
1955 cases' came again to attention in the year 1956.2
An attorney had been appointed administrator of the estate of an intestate decedent. He filed an application in probate court for and secured the determination of heirship and authority to sell real estate of the
decedent in order to pay estate debts.
Subsequently thereto, but obviously for services rendered prior to the
determination of heirship, he entered into an agreement in writing with
the man determined by the probate court to be the sole heir at law for
fees for such representation of the heir. He did not disclose to the probate court his representation of the estate and of the successful claimant
to it.

3
The Supreme Court held this to be a fraud upon it

Where one accepts an appointment as administrator of an estate he
represents that he has no arrangement for compensation from anyone concerned with the estate, in the absence of a full disclosure concermng
such arrangement and the consent of all interested parties thereto. Certainly, such a representation relates to a material existing fact, and if he
is violating his duty, a lawyer making such representation knows of its
falsity. Necessarily, the representation is intended to be relied upon, and
the court in relying upon it almost inevitably makes orders, such as to
fees paid from the estate, which it in all probability would not do had a
full disclosure been made to it.'
'1955 Survey, 7 WEST. RES. L. REV. 235 (1956)
'In re Estate of Wright, 165 Ohio St. 15, 133 N.E.2d 350 (1956)
" See Canons 6, 22, A.B.A. Canons of Professional Ethics.
'It certainly can make no difference here that the attorney occupied the dual capacity
of administrator and attorney for the administrator. If anything his conduct would
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The Supreme Court also found that the attQrney's conduct constituted
misbehavior in the presence of or so near the court as to obstruct the administration of justice, and that for this reason the probate court was authorized to punish him summarily under Revised Code section 2705.01,
and that it need not have to prefer written charges as provided in sections 2705.02 and 2705.03. In this respect the Supreme Court reversed
the prior holding of the court of appeals in the case. 5

Discipline - Inherent Power of Courts
There is not complete uniformity of judicial opinion in the United
States as to the source of the power of courts to disbar or otherwise discipline attorneys.6 While it is probably safe to say that the majority holding is to the effect that such power is inherent in the nature of the judiciary, needs no help from and cannot be limited by the legislative branch,
statutes prescribing reasons for such action and the methods of procedure
7
therefor are not uncommon.
In the case of In re McBrdes the Supreme Court reiterated its stand
that it has inherent jurisdiction to disbar an attorney as an mcadent of its
orgamzaton as a court as well as from its power to admit to the bar, and
that Revised Code section 4705.02 "is but a regulative provision which
does no more than recognize the existing power of the courts."9 Such
legislation is to be interpreted as an aid to and not as a limitation on the
power of the judicial branch. Courts may discipline attorneys on grounds
other than those specified by statutes.
Among such grounds is "moral turpitude." The court then held the
following acts by an attorney to constitute moral turpitude:
1. Solicitmg employment from a designated person.' 0
2. Endeavoring to employ another person for remuneration to solicit
professional employment for him."1
seem the more reprehensible, since there was less opportunity for the situauon to

come to the court's attention.
123 N.E.2d 52 (Ohio App. 1954).
* CHATHAM, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION

81-93 (2d ed.

1955).
7L7.g. OHio REv. CODE § 4705.02. And see Inre Lieberman, 163 Ohio St. 35, 38,
125 N.E.2d 328, 330 (1955). "A proceeding to suspend or remove an attorney at
law from office isstrictly
statutory." See 1954 Survey, 6 WEST. RES. L REV. 235

(1955).
e164 Oluo St. 419, 132 N.E.2d 113 (1956).
9
Quaere: could this power be limited or regulated by a constitutional provision?
Presumably the answer is, "Yes."
" Canons 27, 28, A.B.A. Canons of Professional Ethics.
'Rule XXVII, Rules of Practice of the Ohio Supreme Court, Sections 1, 2, 3.
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Attempting to umpede and obstruct the investigations being made
of his conduct as an attorney by a bar association's grievance committee and vilifying the members thereof by calling them vile
and obscene names.
The court further held that there is no requirement, statutory or otherwise, that charges and specifications of professional misconduct be verified.
Disbarment - Venue of Action
Charges of unprofessional conduct were filed against a lawyer before
the Common Pleas Court of Champaign County, where he had previously
been practicing "for years" and was "still practicing" at the time of filing,
although he had also, "for a long period of time had offices, lived in and
voted in Cuyahoga County." The charges involved misconduct in Champaign County.
Summons was served upon the attorney in two ways: by registered
mail sent to and received by him at his Cleveland office and by the Sheriff
of Cuyahoga County by personal service in Cuyahoga County. The attorney made timely objection in the Champaign County court to the
venue of the action.
The court of appeals held12 that "the practice of law is state wide in
its operation;" that the appellant lawyer was an officer of the Court of
Champaign County, that venue of the proceedings was properly laid there
and that service was properly made in Cuyahoga County.' 3
What Constitutes "Moral Turpitude"
Several noteworthy questions were raised and disposed of in the case
of In re Prentuce.14 The case involved charges of professional misconduct
against a member of the bar for falsification, as a notary public, of jurats
in two written declarations, which purportedly were signed by the declarant in the presence of the attorney-notary, but which were in fact signed
by the notary in the absence of the declarant. Such an act is, of course, a
misdemeanor.' 5 The court held it to be morally turpitudinous and ground
for discipline.
The facts are multitudinous and the court's opinion is necessarily
lengthy, with the result that to set them and it forth in detail would
unduly lengthen this survey. Suffice it to say that the court held: (1)
'In re Crow, 135 N.E.2d 903 (Ohio App. 1955)
"The statute providing for disciplinary proceedings (OHIO REV. CODE § 4705.02)
does not state where disciplinary proceedings shall be filed.
"132 N.E.2d 634 (Ohio App. 1953)
"OHIO REV. CODE § 147.14.
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that the term "moral turpitude" as contained in the code provision' 6 authorizing disciplinary measures is not so vague and indefimite as to
amount to a demal of due process of law under constitutional restrictions;
(2) that conviction of the notary under the statute prohibiting a false
jurat was not required as a condition precedent to disciplinary measures;
and (3) that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to have
preferred its charges prior to or without first referring them to a bar association grievance committee.
The case bears some slight analogy to one' 7 discussed in last year's
survey,' 8 but it is only fair to say that the degree of moral turpitude in
the Prentce decision seems to this author considerably less than that in
the Cohon case.
What Constitutes the "Practice of Law"
The question occasionally is presented whether an attorney has "been
actively engaged in the practice of law as his principal occupation."
Statutes prescribing the .qualifications of judicial and other legal officials
frequently contain such a requirement.' 9 The case of State ex rel. Dewne
v.SchwartzwalderA0 involved the eligibility of respondent in an original
quo warranto action to -fill the office of municipal judge in Columbus,
Ohio. He had been admitted to the practice of law for more than five
years, but the question was whether he had been actively engaged in the
practice of law as his principal occupation for at least five years, as required by the statute21
For various periods of tme subsequent to his admission to practice
respondent had been: an Assistant Attorney General of the State of Ohio
work done by him in this period was conceded to have been the active
practice of law; an attorney examiner in the Department of Liquor Control - this work was held by the Supreme Court to constitute the active
practice of law; Chief of the Permit Division of the Department of Liquor Control - this work was held by the Supreme Court to constitute the
active practice of law. While there is no requirement in law that this
position be filled by an attorney, the duties performed were, said the
22
court, the practice of the profession.
"IOmIo REv.Cona § 4705.02.
"T Fidelity Finance Co. v. Harris, 71 Ohio L.Abs. 309, 126 N.E.2d 812 (1955).
S 1955

Survey, 7 WEST.REs. L. REv. 231 (1956)

"0See 1955 Survey, 7 WEsr.

REs. L. REv. 231 (1956)

' 165 Ohio St. 447, 136 N..2d 47 (1956).
' OIO Ray. CODE § 1901.06.

= Quaere: does it therefore become improper sn futuro to fill this position with a
lay appointee?

